The fibres that hold an innovation network: An analysis of knowledge sharing in the Glare network by Burg, J.C. van et al.
8. The fibres that hold an innovation
network: 1 an analysis of knowledge-
sharing in the Glare network
Elco van Burg, Erik van Raaij and Hans
Berends
During the 1950s, failure of aircrafts due to material fatigue was becoming
a nigbtmare. In 1954, two De HavilJand Cornets crashed. Investigation of
the wreckage of the first Cornet established metaJ fatigue as tbe eau e.
Aluminium, the metaJ commonly used for the skin of aircrafts, is fairly sus-
eeptible to fatigue. Fatigue cracks can cau e weaknesses in the aircraft
structure, which can result in aecidents. Aircraft need to be inspected fre-
quently for fatigue cracks, corrosion and impact damage. These inspections
and repairs, if needed, are very costly because the aircraft cannot be oper-
ated at that time. The failure of aircraft , due to metal fatigue, encouraged
aircraft manufacturer to improve their struclures. Slrengthening the struc-
ture by adding more aluminium leads 10 heavier aircraft, however, which
result in higher fuel co tso
In a earch far solution to fatigu~ corro ion, and impacl damage air-
craft manufactur l'S and research labs start d to look for new material .
Different direction . were pramj ing. Jn the 1950 and 1960s, compo ite
emerged as a new cia of materiaIs: modern fibres such as carbon, aramid
and glass embedded in plastics. This c1ass of material is almost insuscep-
tible to tàtigue and is relatively light. How ver, eomposites are brittie and
have less favourable impact properties than aluminium. The possibilities of
improving the aluminium aHoy itself, lhe second option. were only Jimiled.
The third direction was explored by the Dulch aircraft manufaeturer
Fokker, the Dutch aerospace laboratory NLR and the Delft University of
Technology (TU Delft). They examined the eombination of the good prop-
erties of aluminium with those of eomposites. Together with industrial
partners Iike Alcoa, Akzo and 3M, they developed the sandwich material
Glare. This material is built up from layers of aluminium and fibres (see
Box 8.1). A part of the research was funded by the Dutch governmenl,
through NJVR, the Dutch agency for aerospace programmes. Aftcr more
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BOX 8.1 GLARE®
Glare is an aircraft material built up from thin layers of aluminium
bonded together with adhesive containing embedded glass fibres
(prepreg). lts major application is in the fuselage of Airbus super-
jumbo A380. The material has several advantages, compared to
the 2024-T3 aluminium alloy (Vermeeren, 2003; Vogelesang,
2003). First, the material has remarkably reduced and slower crack
growth, about 10 to 100 times slower than in aluminium alloys. As
a consequence, inspection of the structure for fatigue is not really
necessary during the operational life of the aircraft. Second, the
residual strength of Glare after multiple site damage is significantly
higher. Third, the impact resistance is higher because of the high
strain rate strengthening phenomenon in the glass fibres and the
relatively high failure strain of the fibres. Fourth, the weight of the
material is approximately 10 per cent lower than aluminium. Fifth,
the flame resistance is extremely good. All in all, this means that
aircraft can be designed with less material, and less need tor
inspection. thus saving casts.
The relatively high production cost ot the laminates is the main
disadvantage. These high costs are primarily caused by the
complex and labour-intensive production process.
Aluminium
Prepreg
=-~-.
Souree: Picture: TU Delft.
than 30 years of development and testing, Glare was eventual1y applied to
the Airbus A380 mega-liner, as thefirst large-scale application of a fibre-
metallaminate to an aircraft fuselage (the body of the aircraft).
The Glare network can be characterized as a network with continuOlIS
collaboration centred on a single innovatiol1. The level of involvement
of the individual partners constamly changed over time, as did tht'
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composition of the network. But Fokker, TU Delft and NLR always
stayed together. The goal of this collaboration was to develop fibre-metal
laminates, first Arall and later Glare, and to get these applied to aircraft.
This innovation is explorative in its nature, as it is a new aircraft material
and involves new concepts of manufacturing, designing and applying
these mat..:riab.
In the network, TU Delft had a central role a the initiator of the
research and the knowledge centre. Later on, the role of the knowledge
centre was taken over by a joint venture of Akzo and Alcoa, named
Structural Laminates Company (SLC) succeeded by the Fibre Metal
Laminates Centre of Competence (FMLC). Airbus and Stork Fokker
AESP had a more centra1role in managing the network when the appli-
cation of Glare to the Airbus 380 materialized. Despite the presence of
three core network partners (TU Delft, Fokker, NLR), there was no
central authority that could exert power over all the other network
members.
We find that in a decentralized network Iike this the motivation problem
is the main challenge. The knowledge that has to be shared in this network
is mo tly tacit, and is often core knowledge for the network partners. A
triking conclusion i that the free-riding problem is not found, probably
because the continuity of the collaboration bounded opportunistic behav-
iour by network members.
Seven olutions are found that enable knowledge-sharing in th is network.
These are, in order of importance: interper onal relation hips, agreements
on value distribution, direct communication, network density, ab orptive
capacity. printed and electronic media and goal alignment. Interper onal
relation hip were very important [0 motivate partner. These relationships
cr ated a network idelltit , thu improving ommitment and moti ation.
and probably pre enting an free-riding. Second, agr em nts were impor-
tant to create commitment 10 engage in development. Finally, direct com-
munication was important in establishing interpersonal relationship and
as an opportunity to share knowledge. The solution concepts are, however,
not without risks. Relationships are vulnerable because relationships can be
harmed by per onal tensions, and per onnel change could sever interper-
sonal ties between organizations. Formal rules and agreements can exclude
certain parties from kl1owledge-sharing. thus possibly cutting olf innova-
tion opportunities.
In the remainder of this chapter we will first describe the historical devel-
opment of the Glare network. Subsequently, we analyse knowledge-sharin!!,
in this network. We present an overview of the knowledge-sharing prob-
!ems and discuss the solution concepts that were applied. Finally, we con-
clude this analysis by discussing interesting findings.
148 KI/owledge managemenc and innovQlion in nelworks
THE HISTORY OF THE GLARE NETWORK
Period I: Early History (1971-1981)
The philosophy of Glare and its predecessor Arall rests upon two tech-
nique : bonding and laminating. The first idea sterns from tbe Dutch and
British aircraft manufacturers Fokker and De Havilland. These companies
used to build aircrafts by bonding the wooden parts. This idea was subse-
quently applied to metal, and Fokker applied their first bonded metal wing
structure in the Fokker F-27 in 1955. The second technique laminating
materiais, also sterns from the manufacture of wooden aircrafts. Fokker
introduced the first laminated wing structure in 1916. Laminating multiple
layers of plywood provided an opportunity to use different fibre orienta-
tions, arranging them in such a way that the directional strength of the
material was optimized. This techniqu~ is also applied in GJare, where the
fibres run in different directions.
[n tbe fiTst two decades after the Second World War, Fokker started
Jooking for ways to improve the fatigue properties of metal structures. This
kind of research was carried out in cooperation with NLR and also with
TU Delft. The indlistTial needs of Fokker drove the research. Special
re eaTch projects were funded by the NIVR and qualified testing was done
by LR. Fokker, TU Delft and NLR formed a close triangle in develop-
ment, research and education (Figure 8.1).
This re earch at Fokker re ulted in the bonded metal trllcture of th
F-27. Fatigue te t indjcated that the fatigue properties wer good. In 1971.
Fokker and T Delft tarted tudying reinforcement of bonded alu-
minium tructures witb fibr ,an idea they had een at ASA during a visil
to th S. But thi re earch did not show promising re uit, 0 the idea wa
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Figure 8. / Early history of [he network (1971-/981)
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officially abandoned by Fokker's R&D management. Some people at
Fokker, like Paul Bijlmer, stilJ believed in tbe possibilities. He tried to con-
tinue the research contrary to the management' deci ion. but was forced
to stop. At the individual level, however, same Fokker empluyees continued
their cooperation with the people at TU Delft.
Researchers at TU Delft were convinced that fibre-metallaminates could
have better fatigue properties than aluminium aJloys. These researchers
included the group around Professor Schijve (who was the farmer head of
the Structures and Materials Department at NLR) and Vogelesang (who
later became Schijve's successor as a professor in Delft). This group initi-
ated a research programme on laminated sheet material , which resulted in.
a new kind of material, called Fibre-Metal Laminates (FMLs).
One of the first projects was carried out by a graduate student, Roei
Marissen, who finished his thesis in 1980. Using the framework he devel-
oped in his thesis the research group was able to optimize the aluminium
sheet thickness, the types of fibre and the fibre volume fraction. This
resulted in thinner aluminium sheets, and for the fibre, aramid was chosen.
Tests on this improved laminate sbowed that the material had excellent
fatigue performance. The key to this is the 'crack bridging' mechani m of
the fibre . Fibres remain intact under fatigue loading, whereas the alu-
minium cracks. The research at TU Delft thus resulted in a new material,
whieh they called 'Arall' (Aramid Reinforced Alumjnium Lamioates) (de
Vrie ,2001: 2; Vlot, 2001: 43).
Period [I: etwork around Arall (1981-1991)
In pired b the promising re ults for Arall, TU Delft continued it research
on fibre-metal laminates and looked for indu try collaboration and
fundin . B cau e the managem ot of Fokker wa not interested in fibre-
metallaminates at that time and because specific material knowledge was
needed, TU Delft looked for other industrial partners. lndustry involve-
ment was especially needed for the supply and knowledge of strong fibre
and thin aluminium sheets. Vogelesang got the Dulch chemicaI company
Akzo interested in providing aramid fibres. The first step Akzo taak was to
acquire the rights of the Arall patents that were filed in January 1981 by TU
Delft with Vogelesang and Marissen as inventors. Akzo, in return, sup-
ported the research in Delft with a grant of 100000 guilders a year, by pro-
viding equipment and materiais, and by giving access to their lab.
By the end of )981, a second industrial partner had become involved.
Through existing contacts at TU Delft, the American aluminium producer
Alcoa became interested in the new material. Alcoa was willing to supply the
thin aluminium sheets needed for Arall, although manufacturing these lhin
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sheets was difficult and required a lot of work. But Alcoa was concerned tlhat
composites would replace aluminium in the future and with Arall they could
both supply their aluminium and play a role in the market for composite
material . Alcoa received a five-year exclusive Iicence to produce Arall, and
laulJched the first commercial version of Arall in 1983. The third company
to become involved was 3M, which supplied the 'prepreg' for bonding the
aluminium sheets and the fibres. Unlike Alcoa and Akzo, 3M was not a
development partner, but just a supplier of the adhesive.
Despite the Jack of interest in FMLs, Fokker was still an obvious indus-
trial partner in the development because of the long relationship between
TU Delft, Fokker and NLR. Therefore, the different parties tried to get
Fokker involved. First, NIVR asked Fokker to play a more active role in
Arall applications. [n 1984, this request resulted in an Arall working group
with representatives from TU Delft, Fokker, NLR and NrVR. A wing
panel for the existing Fokker F-27 could be developed and tested. First
studies on the application of Arall on an 1'-27 wing had already been
carried out by two students of Jan Willem Gunnink at TU Delft. This
marked the fiTSt involvement of Gunnink in the development of FML . It
wa remarkable certainly at that time, that Delft had designed the -ng
panels and had even made the production drawings according to Fokker
specifications, so tbat Fokker could easily produce the panels. Delft also
designed all kinds of detailed test specimens and te ted them. So Fok er
could test the larger ize panels including the full-scale panel. The de el-
opmen! of this wing wa funded by NIVR the fir t time TU Delft received
direct funding from NIVR. This sparked a new era in which the role of T
o lft moved from basic research towards development and testing, directly
fund d by the government.
Tests on the full- cale F-27 panel again showed the x ellent proper ie
of rail for fatigue and damage tIran e. A a re uIt, T 0 Irt tried to
convince Fokker to use Arall in one of their aircrarts. In 1984, however,
Fokker decided not to use Arall in its new F-SO. According to Daan Krook
(former member of the board of directars of Fokker), Fokker would
develop the F-Sü with a 'minimum change configuration' from the existing
F-27. Therefore, a major change Iike applying Arall instead of aluminium
was out of the question. The good results of the F-27 wing project never-
theless prompted Fokker to ask NLR to get more involved in the project,
which the people at TU Delft feIt was an attempt to by-pass their involve-
ment (Vlot, 2001: 71). TU Delft was upset by this behaviour of Fokker and
told Fokker that it would continue with Akzo, Alcoa and 3M as primary
partners. So the relationship between TU Delft and Fokker became
strainl:d. lndividual relationships between people at Fokker and TU Delft
were stronger than the official dispute, and people on bath sides continued
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to be inv0hed in the project and remained on speaking terms and cooper-
ative because they personally believed in the material and in the need ror
cooperation. But Arall was never appJied to a commercial F-27, mainly
because it was too expensive to qualify as the new material [or an existing
aircraft.
RoeI Marissen, one of the inventors of Arall, moved to the German aero-
space research institute DFVLR (later called DLR). This created links
between DFVLR and Alcoa, NLR and TU Delft. However, DFVLR never
had a real role in the development of Arall because Marissen was working
in other directions than the people at TU Delft. The industrial partners in
the Arall network limited knowledge-sharing between people at TU Delft
and Marissen at DFVLR because they were concerned about leaking core
knowledge in the direction of their German competitors.
The skies looked bright for Arall, but soon same cJouds would show up.
ln 1987, Alcoa opened an Arall plant in Pittsburg (PA). Knowledge about
the material properties of Arall originated from TU Delft and was inte-
grated with the production knowledge of Alcoa. Shortly after the opening
of the Arall production facility, an Arall conference was held in Seven
Springs (PA). At this conference, the 'jur} of the international aviation
community' was present and the TU Delft community presented excellent
results for Arall at the conference. Off- tage, however, Geert Roebroeks, a
Ph.D. student from TU Delft, had di covered same disappointing Arall
propertie and the group at T Delft had already started working on a
olution with glass fibres as an alternative to aramid. Marissen who was
still working on Arall in Germany, had also found that aramid fibres
around a crack would break under the cyclic loading condition that occur
in fu elages. Mari sen wa up et about the fact that hi role in the de elop-
ment of rail wa not acknowledged by the people from T Delft. He
therefore decided to mention the detrimental properties in hi presentation
in order to thwart, as he saw it, the development of Arall. The publication
of some disappointing results and the attempts of the people at TU Delft
to develop an alternative material harmed the image of Arall to some
extent. The aviation community, however, became convineed that the prin-
ciple of th~ material was promising. which created space for the acceptance
of an improved material (Vlot, 2001: 78).
Tht' n~w variant of the material, with glass fibres, did not have the detri-
mental properties of Arall, and TU Delft coneentrated on further devel-
upment of this material, which they calied Glare (GLass Aluminium
REinforeed). A patent on this new material was filed by Akzo in October
1987 and was finally aecepted in 1991. At the same time, Alcoa had intro-
duced it~ first commercial AraJl produets and had managed to get a first
application of Arall in the cargo door of the McDonnell Douglas C-17
152
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military transport aircraft in 1988. The complete network at thi period is
shown in Figure 8.2.
Period UJ: etwork around Glare (1991-2001)
While Alcoa had its fir"t commercial Arall application. the relation hip
between Alcoa and Akzo deteriorated. The exclusive production rights that
Akzo had licensed to Alcoa were expiring. Akzo was losing interest, but
thanks to Daan Krook's lobbying with the Akzo management, they contin-
ued to be involved, and started a Glare business. Akzo wanted to set up a
joint venture with Alcoa for both Glare and Arall because this would possi-
bly give Akzo opportunities to sel! tibres to the aerospace market. But Alcoa
was not willing 10 have this joint venture, and the relationship became
strained. Furthermore, a Dutch lobby at the international aerospace com-
munity for Glare, consisting of people from Akzo and TU Delft harmed the
commercial position of AraI!. Alcoa finally decided ta go along with Akzo
and Glare. This resulted in a joint venture, Structural Laminates Company
(SLC), in 1991, which owned the patents. Akzo owned one-third and Alcoa
two-thirds of this joint venture. The partnership company SLC, located in
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the US, was responsible for the comrnercialization of Glare and Arai!. On
the DUICh side, the subsidiary of SLC, StructuraJ Laminates BV (SLBV), was
located in Delft and was supposed to do research and technica] marketing.
Although there was a promising new material, there was tiJl a Jong way
to go. The goal was to get FMLs on a new aircraft type. The first challenge
was to test and quaJify the material. Another challenge was to achieve the
acceptance of the aviation industry. A major disadvantage for the aviation
industry was the high costs of Glare, which were at that time up to 10 time
higher than aluminium. Production was labour intensive and difficult. A
major breakthrough came in 1993 when the concept of splicing was devel-
oped. With splices Glare panels can be wider than the size of the metal
sheets they are made of. These wider panels significantly reduce the instal-
lation costs of Glare.
Various aircraft construction companies developed an interest in the
material. First,in 1988, peop1c at MBB (which later became a part of
Airbus Germany) read an article about Arall by Vogelesang and eonsidered
it to be a promising materia!. These peopJe were responsible for testing a
egment (called a 'barrel') of the Airbus A330 and A340. They were ab1e to
test new materials too, and they asked TU Delft to produce a Glare test
panel for the barrel. With funding from Akzo, TU Delft could get Fokker
to produce the panels. The tests were performed in 1990 and the results were
good. The people at Airbus Germany (the current name) eontinul:d testing
Glare for different applications during the 1990 .
A econd company with an interest in GJare was Boeing. In 1990, Glare
wa elected for a cargo floor in the Boeing 777 becau e of its excellent
impact propertie . In J993, Rob van Oost from SLC wa ent to Boeing to
tud th application of Glare on the suecessor of tbe 747 Jumbo Jet.
Be au e the requirements of thi new plane frequently ehanged, he finally
tudi d appli ati n in th already i ting Boeing 777. Although the ruit
Iooked promising. Boeing decided not to u e GJare for the primary struc-
ture of the 777.
While industry interest grew, Alcoa was frustrating the people from SLC
who tried to sell Glare to the a irera ft industry. During the 1990s, the poliey
of Alcoa regarding Glare had changed. First, Arall was not a commercial
success, and therefore their Arall plant was operating at aloss. Second.
Glare was more and more seen as a eompetitor for their aluminium.
because it was targeted at the same fuselage marker. Strategically, they
wanted to prevent the application of Glare and therefore they obstructed
the commercialization of Glare through SLC, sometimes by preventing
SLC people from talking to deeision-makers at aircraft construct ion com-
panies, at other times by giving inadequate or inaccurate informatioTI. The
reason why Boeing deeided not to use Glare, in spite of good test results
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was in part a result of Alcoa's behaviour. Bill Evancho (at that time, head
of SLC) believed that the salespeople from Alcoa convineed Boeing not to
use Glare. Jn 1993, this finally resulted in a moratorium on Glare studi s,
set by thc management of Bo~ing.
While this closed the door to Boeing, interest from other sides grew. The
third organization that became interested was the US Air Force. A US Air
Force officer had heard about Arall and started his Ph.D. study on Glare at
TU Delft in the early 1990s. On his return, he convineed the US Air Force
to lIse Glare for fuselage repairs of the C-5A Galaxy transporter (Vlot,
200 I: 130, 131; Scholtens, 1995). Besides this programme, the lTS Air Force
also evaluated Arall for a rudder, for flaps and for dorsal covers.
A fourth company with an interest was Bombardier Aerospace. Jn 1996,
they decided to use Glare for a part of the Learjet 45 business jet. The fifth
company was Garuda Airlines (Indonesia) who used Glare for a panel of an
Airbus A330 (Vlot, 2001: 138). And subsequently, in April 1999, an experi-
menta1 Glare fuselage panel was installed on a German Luftwaffe A31 O.
Furthermore, US Airways used Glare in a cargo bay floor, and Galaxy
Scientific Corporation used Glare in an explosion-hardened container.
Also Aérospatiale (later Airbus France) became involved. [n 1994, Buwe
van Wimersma was sent to TouJou e by SLC. He studied the application of
GJare to the A330. Later, in J997 and 1998, he and his colleague Gise Wit
became members of the Large Aircraft Division led by Jens Hinrichsen.
They prepared information about Glare to convince him to apply it. Thi
e entually resulted in the choice of Glare for the fuselage of the A3XX
hich later became the A380.
The group at TU Delft needed extra [unding for the iocr a ing numb I'
of te tand exp riment . The Dutch go emment saw the need for a tI' ng
push to Airbu , belped by the lobbying efforts of Krook, Gunnink and
og Ie ang. Tb funded half the osts of tbe A31 0 panel and als all -
cated in total about 30 million euros to the Glare project in the period 1997
to 2003, which was coordinated by the NJVR. Thi funding was used
to start the Glare Technology Program (GTP, later Glare Research
Programme, GRP), in which TU Delft, SLC (later SU and FMLC), NLR,
Airbus and Stork Fokker AESP were invoJved. Later, a significant part of
the money was also used to get Glare tested in the mega-liner barrel test, a
huge fuselage section similar to the A380. This test began in 2001 and the
panels are still heing studied today. These tests were perfornled at Airbus
Germany, but NLR engineers wen: involved in these tests as weil. Through
this involvement, they learned aboutAirbus's t~st methods and results.
Alcoa considered Airbus's growing intl:rest in Glare as a threat to their
core business, the production of aluminium. They convineed Akzo to shur
down the production facility of SLC, formally because of low customer
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intere t. Alcoa stopped supplying thin aluminium heets and the praduc-
tion of Arall and Glare wa stopped in 1997. A a re uit McDonneII
Dougla and Boeing needed aluminium replacements for re pecti ely lbe
cargo door of the -17 and the cargo Roor of the Boeing 777. The com-
mercial activities of SLC were stopped a weil. Alcoa jusl kept SL alive
to keep contral over the patent righls. A Iicence for econdary applications
was given to Aviation Equipment, Inc. (AEI). They were succe sful in the
application of GJare to hardened contain~rsand aircraft cargo bay floors.
They also provided Glare for the Learjet 45 anJ supported Bombardier in
their fibre-metal laminates R&D programme. The entire network for the
period 1991-2001 is depicted in Figure lU.
Alcoa eventually withdrew and the joint venture SLC was broken up. At
first, Akzo continued its GJare aclivities. With the help of Daan Krook
(who was a board member of SLC), Akzo acquired licences for GJart' in
Europe. Akzo restructured SLBV to Structural Laminates Industries (SU).
But shortly after that, Akzo reconsidered the fit of SU with the core
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business of Akw. They decided to selJ SU hecause they cou1d not produce
the material they did not supply the specific glass fibre that was used in
Glare and their core activities were not in the aerospace sector. As aresuIt,
in 1998, Akw sold SU to Stork Aerospace.
At Stork Aerospace, SU became incorporated in Fokker AESP. Fokker
AESP consisted of what was left of Fok\...er, which had gone bankrupt in
1996. So, after years of low commitment on the part ()f Fokker, the 'new'
Fokker became heavily invo1ved again. With the incorporation of SLI in
Fokker AESP, Fokker finally got a licence for the production of Glare.
Period IV: Airbus and Future G1are (2001-)
As Alcoa and Akw withdrew from the network, interest from Airbus
(which resulted from a merger in 2001 between aerospace companie in
Germany, Sp:lin, England and France) grew. Tbey became convinced of the
excellent propertjes of Glare after an exciting lubbying period. In particu-
lar, the opportunity for weight reduction persuaded them. In 200 I, the
Heads of Agreement for application of G1are in the A380 was signed with
Stork Fokker AESP who would be producing the material. But the indus-
trialization of Glare was still at an early stage. Stork Fokker AESP quickly
started building a manufacturing plant, indu trializing Glare and qualify-
iog the product ion proces according to aerospace norms. The plant
\ as built in Papendrecht, The Netherlands, and was officially opened in
ovember 2003, although production had already begun in 2002. Airbu
al 0 wanted to acquire the knowledge and capability of manufactUl-ing
Glare and opened a. plant in ordenbam. Germany, to manufactur fi of
the 27 Glare panel. The knowledge about Glare propertie r quired f, r
these production facilities wa mainly obtained from peopJe from the
farm r SL , nO\ \ orking at FML and Stork Fokker AESP.
To get the material ready for tbe manufacture of the first A380 the
par ties worked closely together. The design of Glare parts and development
of the design principles occurred in close cooperation between Stork
Fokker AESP and Airbus. These companies also jointly developed pro-
duction and improved the material further. This resulted in a new gen-
eration of Glare, with improved strength. calied HSS Glare. For the
qualification of the material NLR Stork Fokker AESP, FMLC, TU Delft
and Airbus worked closely together to demonstrate the quality of the mate-
rial and to perfarm all tests. TU Delft, with its very enthusiastic group of
students and employees, performed tests that showed which fields needed
more testing or even fUl-ther improvement and which fielJs had been tested
satisfactorily. The qualification testing was subsequently done by NLR,
according to the norms in aerospace.
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To continue research on the material and to provide knowledge about
Glare to the network partners, a Glare centre of compelence was estab-
]ished. This centre, Fibre Meta1 Laminates Centre of Competence (FMLC),
wa foundeo by TU Delft, NLR and Stork Fokker AESP in 2001. This
centre also had the task of exploring different appJications of Glare.
Another lask was to distribute the funding frorn the NIVR and the govem-
ment. But because Airbus became fully involved in the development of
Glare, lhe nece sity for extemal funding decrea ed. In 2003, also due
to policy changes by th Dutch government funding was reduced to a
minimum. The managing director of FMLC was Jan Willem Gunnink. But
b the end of 2004, following a di pute 0 er policy, Gunnink left FMLC and
·tarted a new company named GTM. Almo 1all the employe from FMLC
joined this new company. GTM is currently, among other projects, devel-
oping new materials and structures, which includeimprovements to alu-
minium tructures. One of their c1ients is Alcoa, which again has expressed
interest in the development of FMLs and is also cooperating wilh Airbus
on developments around Glare and laminated aircraft materiais.
Besides GTM, another small new company appeared, GlobalTechnics
(see Figure 8.4 for the network as of 2001). Gise Wit, Adel Khoudja and a
third partner [ounded this enterprise. They provide knowledge and experi-
ence of Glare to the network and perform calculations on Glare. Their
main c1ients are Stork Fokker AESP, Airbus, and Airbus partners.
Table 8.1 lists the main events in the development of Glare. Thirty years
may seem like a long time for sueh an innovation to come to fruition. One
reason for the long development palh is the fact that extensive makrial
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Table 8.1
Year
ca. 1978
ca. 1981
ca. 1984
1987
1990
1990--1999
1991
1993
1994
1996
1997
1997
1998
2001
2001
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
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Main evenls in 30 years of Glare developmem
Ev nt
Professor Boud Vogelesang develops fibre-metal laminates (FML)
at TU Delft building on two decades of co1Jaboration belween
Fokker, TU Delft and NLR.
Involvement of Akzo, Alcoa and 3M in the development of an
aramid fibre reinforced FML product: Aral\'
Jan Willem Gunnink leads Arall tests on Fokker F-27 wing panel.
Alcoa open Arall plant; Arall material properties questioned at
Seven Springs conference; Akzo files first patent for a ncw,
glass-fibre-reinforced FML product: Glare.
Glare tested at Boeing; fir t Glare tests at MBR (later: Airbus
Germany); further tests at MBB contillUed through the 1990s.
Various small-scale applications of Glare at Bombardier. US Air
Force. German Luftwaffe and others.
Glare patent accepted; Alcoa-Akzo joint venture (SLC) lor Arall
and Glare established.
Technological breakthrough ('spI icing') enables more eflicient
production of Glare.
Buwe van Wimer ma (frorn SLC) studies Glare application at
Aéro patiale (later: Airbus France).
Bankruptcy of Fokker; Stork Fokker AESP e tablished.
Buwe an Wimersma and Gise Wit (both from SLC) seconded lo
Airbu to ·tudy application of Glare to the Airbu A3XX
mega-liner.
Glare Technology Project (GTP) e tabli hed, fuoded in part by th
DUlch goveromenl. Partner include TU D Ift, L, LR. irbus
Stork Fokk r AE P.
I oa wilhdraw from SL . Akzo re tructures SL inl Ll, which
i eventually old to tork Fokker A P.
Start of the mega-liner barr I te t at irbus G rmany.
Heads of Agreement signed belween Airbus and Stork Fokker to
produce Glare for the A380 mega-liner fuselage. Stork Fokker and
Dutch govemment invest in Glare production capability.
TU Delft, Stork Fokker and NLR establish fibre-metallaminate
centre of competence (FMLC).
Glare production slarted in Papendrecht and Nordenham.
Airbus takes fuU control of Glare developments related te the A380
<tnd thereby Iimits the role of other partners like FMLC and TU
Delft.
Two new start-ups established for further development of Glare:
GTM, by Jan WilIem Gunnink, and GlobalTechnics, by Gise Wit
and two partners.
First Airbus A380 prototype takes off with a 350 m 2 Glare fuselage
section.
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quaJifications are necessary before a new material can be applied to any air-
craft structure. A second reason is that aerospace manufacturers will gen-
erally only make an investment in a new material when they design a
completely new type of aircraft. This has severely Iimited the Bumber of
windows of opportunity fOT" GJare. With only a limited number
of sufficiently large aerospace manufacturers in the world, the developers
of Glare had to make sure that the right people at sucb companies were
convinced of the superior properties of Glare just as plans for a new air-
craft type were being developed.
KNOWLEDGE-SHARING PROBLEMS IN THE GLARE
NETWORK
The development of fibre-metal laminates eventually Jeading to lhe pro-
duction and application of Glare, started as a loose cooperation between
Fokker, NLR and TU Delft. Over time, tbe network expanded and the level
of involvement of partners changed. Problems and tensions between part-
ners came and went. Over lhe years tbe partners in the network bad to
create, sbare, and integrate knowledge related to material propertjes, mate-
rials testing, aerospace requirement , de ign knowledge and production
knowiedge. Some of this knowledge could be codified and shared 'on
paper'· other knowledge wa of tbe tacit kind. All this knowledge-sbaring
took place without a core network player orcbestrating tbe process or a
grand design for knowledge-sharing. Yet in spite of variou knowledge-
sharing problems btween network partner and the lack of explicit knowl-
edge management to solv these problem , the goal was eventually achieved:
the fiT. t Airbu A380 uper-jumbo took to tbe air in April, 2005 witb 350 m2
ection of Glare panels in Îl [u lag. What is the tory bebind thi success?
To unravel this story. we wil! first discus the four general knowledge-
sharing problems and subsequently pay attention to the solutions, as they
appeared in tbis case study. In the Glare network, tbe main knowledge-
sharing problems were those related to efficiency and motivation. The e
problems were tackled through interpersonal relationships. agreements on
value distribution and sanctions. These solution concepts are the most
salient and provide all explanation of the successful knowledge-sharing in
spite of the lack of a grand design of knowJedge management.
lVlotivation
The motivation of partners to share knowledge is very important. In the
Glare case, motivation was not a probJem generally. Various individuals
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acted as passionate inspirers, motivating othas to stay involved and share
knowledge. Professional pride and apassion for fibre-metal lamin' les
facilitated knowledge-sharing in the network. But, at times, competition,
conflict, and personal pride would negatively inftuence motivation. The
relationship betweC'n TU Delft and Fokker was not always without prob-
lems, for instance. They repeatedly argued ab0ut who invented Arall.
Fokker would give presentations abollt Arall without naming TU Delftt. as
the inventor. There would also be competitive strife about who should
receive funding from NJVR; the industrial partner Fokker, or the acade-
mic partner TU Delft. This caused recurring conflicts between Fokker
and TU Delft, although these were sometimes more moral than formal
confticts (Vlot, 200 I: 72, 73). Such confticts decreased the motivation of
the partners to cooperate with each other. Aftel' the bankruptcy of
Fokker in 1996, the problem largely disappeared because the people
involved in the initial conflict were no longer working at TU Delft or
Fokker.
Issues caused by personal pride and personal 'battles for competence'
were the second driver behind the motivation problem. This problem fi rst
appeared in the relationship between NLR employees and people from TU
Delft. The very enthusiastic Vogele ang came to NLR with his new mat r-
ial and NLR performed tests on the material. But the people at NLR w re
ceptical and have more or les remained so ever since. This cau ed
difficultie in the relationship. The tensions between Mari sen and the
people [rom T Delft were also about per onal pride. And in the la t pha e
of the development, knowledge- haring between Fokker AESP and Airbus
ordenham wa Ie s optimal becau e people aw it a a battle for compe-
tence' lhu creating a ituation where it would be a weakn tak the
other for help.
FinaU, th comp titi e trategies of firms in the n tw rk al 0 hind r d
(he motivation CO share knowiedge. In the early years of Glare Alcoa
obstructed contacts between SLC and Boeing because they starled to see
Glare as a competitor to their aluminium. They were no longer motivated
to turn Glare into a success. More recently, the motivation to hare knowl-
edge between Airbus-Fokker and other interested parties has been hindered
by Airbus's concerns over knowledge leaking to Boeing.
Boundaries
In the Glare network, people from different organizations and from
different backgrounds had to work together and share knowiedge. Crossing
the boundaries between different practices, cult.ures aDlI organi7ations was
sometim~s Jitficult. In Ihis case study, the two most influential boundaries
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that had to be crossed were boundaries between culture (both natiooal and
corporate) and between professional backgrounds.
The boundaries between cultures appeared for example in the relation-
ship between TU Delft and NLR. This caused di cussions about the
demarcation of tasks. According to Vogelesang, tbis can also be interpreted
as atension between a professional research organization (NLR) and an
educational institute without a qllalified testing lab (TU Delft). Boundaries
between national cultures were pre ent between Alcoa and the Dutch part-
ners, and between Airbus France and the Dutch partners togetber with
Airbus Germany.
Knowledge-sharing was at times hampered because of boundaries
between people with different backgrounds. Even when people bad the
same profession, [or example researchers, it was hard to uoderstand each
other s results, because of the differences belween the research areas and
interest. For example, in the 1990s when Fokker AESP and Airbus were
asked to provide guidance 00 the developments at TU Delft, they lacked
the appropriate knowledge to do this.
Efficiency
As the de elopment of Arall and Glare progre ed, the tock of knowledge
accumuJated, and more and more indi iduals became involved. Tbis exac-
erbated the challenge of creating and haring knowledge in an efficient way.
The efficiency problem ha two main cause : lack of indu try leader hip in
development, alld frequent change of personnel.
The fir t challenge wa related particularly to the efficiency of crealing
knowIedge. The developmeots at T Delft did oot alway fit tbe oeed of
industry. M re 'guidance' from indu tr \ a oeeded. But the industrial part-
n r la ked lhe appropriate in ight to e the wa ahead or did oot under-
stand the priority of providing guidance. As aresult. ometimes re earch wa
undertaken which was not very uscful for the further developmeot of FML .
Gise Wit, who was involved in the cooperation of Airbus, TU Delft and
Fokker, said: 'A lot of reports were very useful. but also a number ended up
in the garbage cao'. After a while, some individuals at Airbus were appointed
to guide the research, but they often lacked appropriate knowledge and time
to provide dficient guidance. Therefore, SLBV, later on SU and in tbe last
phase FMLC, took the lead in directing activities.
Second, the efficiency of knowledge-sharing was harmed by regular
change of personnel in the network. At TU Delft, a lot of research in the
lab was carried out by graduates. These former students usually worked very
el1lhllSiastically in the lab for about two years and then moved to a job else-
where. When they did not end up working for one of the network partners,
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the knowledge they acquired often disappeared from the network.
According to Gise Wit, at that time working for Fokker: 'The knowledge
rests with a limited number of peopk. bècause the others Ieave the network
quickly. Of course, it rests with th~' pGrmanent employees. Iike Ad Vlot and
Geert Roebroeks. But Ad Vlot died, Boud Vogelesang left.... So, J think
that the knowledge also seeped away to some extent.' On the other hand,
graduates heading out ta atber companies within the network helped to diis-
perse knawiedge, thus improving efficiency.
Knowledge-sharing efficiency was not helped either by the frequent
change in those attending GRP meetings. Some network partners did not
acknowledge the important role of the GR P meetings for knowledge
exchange and sent whoever was available 10 these meetings, thus forgo-
ing the opportunity to build long-term relationships between team
members.
The efficiency problem was never fully eliminated. Regular meetings and
strong interpersonal relationships somewhat reduced this problem. Tn pair-
ticular, the research programmes increased the efficiency of knowledge-
sharing, because these established some sort of central coordination.
Nevertheless, 10 (out of 17) respondent named the efficiency problem (alo
talking about the la t phases), because it was a centra! issue in knowledge-
sharing in the whole development trajectory.
Free-riding
[n the Glare network, no clear instance of the free-riding problem were
found. Sometimes, lhe danger of free-riding raised its head, a in 1986
when Fokker tarted negotialion with NLR to g t them more invoJved in
the development, wbile the c ntre of de elopm nt wa lill at T Delft.
Fokker even que tioned whether there wa till a role for TU Delft. At T
De/ft, they feit, however, thaI Fokker had 'hijacked' the Arall project
without having pUI much effort into it before. Because Delft did not want
to support this new direction, the attempl failed. Thus. the frec-rider
problem was tackled in a natural way. All respondents.looking back at the
whole development trajectory, said that no partner profited more than
their fair share considering their contributions. Some partners profited
more than others, but they also took more risks and spent more effort and
money on the Glare development. Because all partners were willing to
cooperate for a long time the fr~e-riding problem did not occu!'. Within
this long time frame, partners did not show any significant opportunistic
behaviour. Another explanation for the prevention anel reduction of the
free-riding probIem is the strong network identity among. the core of the
individuals involved. Such a network identity motivated them to share
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knowiedge, and created commitment (shared norms and beliels) and trust
which prevented free-riding.
SOLUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE-SHAR ING IN THE
GLARE NETWORK
In the absence of conscious knowledge management in the Glare network
several solution concepts were applied more or less unconsciously that
enabled and improved knowledge-sharing. An overview and illustration of
the findings is presented in Table 8.2. Each solution concept is discussed in
the following text, in order to provide more insight into their effectiveness
in the Glare case. This discussion concludes with a graphical representation
of the relationships between solution concepts and problems.
The Effeetiveness of Interpersonal Relationships
The concept of interpersonal relationships is a solution that explains the
success story of Glare to a large extent. Where organizations often consid-
ered their own aims and goals instead of the common good, the interper-
sonal contacts provided a trong informal network committed to the
development of FMLs. This 'Glare community was also a basis for tru t.
The informaJ network wa an important enabler for knowledge-sharing in
the network of organizations. When organizations practically withdrew
from the network, individual engineers continued to be involved carried on
the development and shared their knowiedge. Althougb organization
restricted knowledge- haring, theengineer ontinued to hare their knowI-
edge, because of hared belie~ and pa sion for the material. The e inter-
per onal ontacts \ ere cr aled at conference like th AraU conference,
meetings within th.: aerospace field (Brite Euram programme, GRP, etc.),
and last but not least through TU Delft graduate heading out into com-
panies all over the world. Over time the inlerpersonal network grew
because more people became involved and more graduates swarmed out.
The solution concept of interpersonal relationsbips is, however, fairly
vulnerable. When relationships break up because of confliets or personnel
change the channel tor knowledge-sharing between organizations disap-
pears. For example, a wnflict that occurred in the 1980s damaged the rela-
tionship between people at Fokker and people from TU Delft for a long
time, creating Chinese walls between these groups and influellcing
knowledge-sharing. In the words of Adel Khoudja: 'In the past, there was
a conflict between TU Delft and Fokk.:r. [ was part of Fokker. Much later,
YOll could still not easily come back in the TU Delft group'.
Tub/e 8.2 Overview and illuSlration of so/ulion concept.1
Solution concept Subcategories
lnterpersonal
relationships
Agreements on Agreements,
value knowledge
di~tribution protection rules,
knowledge-sharing
....
rules, property rule
0-
""- Direct Co-location,
communication conferences,
frequent
communication,
meetings, site vi its,
social events, team
wurking, training
Network density Knowledge brokers
Adel Khoudja (Fokker, GlobalTechnics) had good relationships witb people at Airbus
and with Gi e Wit and Geert Roebroeks. Jan Wil!em Gunnink had good relationships
wilb Jens Hinrichsen, Bil! Evancho, Daan Krook and Boud Vogelesang.
T Delft with Akzo, Alcoa and 3M; SLC; GRP; Barrel test; Airbus witb Fokker
AESP; MOU of Airbus.
GRP teams who worked on as igned Glare-related developments. The Large Aircraft
Divi ion at Airbus in Toulouse (co-Iocated) where SLC people and Fokker (A ESP)
people were involved. Aral! conferences (Seven Springs, 1987 and TU Delft, 1988) and
lare conferences with presentation for researchers aircraft manufacturers and
a iation companies. Frequently held GRP meetings. NLR engineers who visited the
barr I te t. People from TU Delft visiting Airbus's production facilities and design
team. Milestone events for the people involved in GRP Design trainings held at
irbus.
FMLC functioned as a formal knowledge institute, brokering knowledge of imohed
partners. There were comacts at Airbus, who were responsible for bringing the right
people in contact with each other. Thc spin-offs, GT\1 and GlobalTcchnics, can broker
knowledge within and outside the (core) network.
Absorptive
Capacity
Printed and
electron ic
media
Goal
alignm.:nt
Personnel transfer,
graduating student
lnformation
systems, reports.
publications
Shared goals,
demarcation,
guidance of
industry
Su e van Wimersma was transferred from SLC to Aérospatiale, in 1994 to study the
application of Glare on the A330 and in 1997 to participate in the Large Aircraft
divi ion (for the A380). In 1993 Rob van Oost from SLC was sent to Boeing to study
the application of Glare on the succe sor of the 747 Jumbo Jet, Tjerk de Vries, a Ph.D.
tudent working on Glare frorn TU Delft went to Airbus' in addition, many graduates
frorn TU Delft went to aerospace cornpanies.
Common e-mail system ; data-links for the design of the Glare parts of the A380
between Fokker AESP and Airbus: 200 test reports with results for 'basic Glare'; a
stre s manual for Glare written by people at GlobalTechnics and used within Airbu .
dissertalÎons from TU Delft; graduation reports from TU Delft; journal articles from
researchers at TU Delft.
hared goal: application of Glare on the A380 of the Dernarcalion responsibilities
and \Vork field between NLR and TU Delft. Priority setting of Airbus and Fokker for
T Delft.
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Agreements on Value Oistribution: Protection and Creation of
Commitment
Al10ther important solution concept that can shed some light on the
dynamics of the development of Glare concerns the rules and agreements
in the Glare network. Over time, several formal agreements were made.
These mies and agreements had the positive effect that they created com-
mitment to haring knowiedge, but on the other hand knowledge-sharing
with excluded parties became more limited. For example, TU Delft made
agreements about intellectual property and funding with Akzo, Aleoa and
3M. These agreements solidified the commitments of Akzo, Aleaa, and 3M
to the development of FMLs. But these agreements also had an oppo ite
effect: tbey restricted knowledge-sbaring with partners in the periphery of
the core network, like Marissen working for DFVLR in Germany.
The positive effect of agreements is also illustrated by the agreed joint
venture of Akzo and Aleoa: SLC. This agreement proved to be effective in
support of knowledge-sharing when Aleoa wanted to get rid of Glare.
Because Alcoa had an agreement with Akzo, ending the involvement would
have had legal consequences. Therefore Aleoa was urged to find a better
way out, which created the chance to keep Glare in The Netherland .
Otherwise, Aleoa would probably have put the Glare patents and knowledge
on a helf, thus restricting further development and knowledge-sharing.
Direct Communication
Meeting were an effective means of direct communi at ion belween repre-
entati es of network partner. Different kind of meeting existed: site
visit training e ion, discu ion meetings, (co-located) team working,
conferenc and ocial event . Each had their 0\ n effeetivene , frequenc
and altendees. Site visits were effective and efficient because they enabled
rich interaction (live), provided tbe complete context (e.g. production facil-
ities, test set-up) and also enabled knowledge-sharing in a protected situa-
tion. For example, with the barrel test, visiting engineers from NLR had a
chance to see the whole test and set-up. If they had not visited the test, this
knowledge would not have been shared.
Meetings were a standard way of knowledge-sharing throughout tbe
development trajectory. In the 1980s and at the beginning of the I990s, there
was na formal network-wide consultative structure. From the inception of
the research programmes (GTP, GRP), frequent meetings were held with the
different parties and at different levels. These meetings were effective in
reducing confliets through trust-building, in dealing with motivation issues
by creating commitment, and in increasing knowledge-sbaring efficiency
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through providing a rich knowledge channel. Not all partie were as moti-
vated to attend these meeting and contribute, which in some case led to fre-
quently changing representatives in the meetings. This was not conducive to
knowledge-sharing. A context-specific kind of meeting was the (academie)
conference. Such conferences were effective at sharing knowiedge, creating
interest in prospective partners, sharing beliefs, building new relationships
and creating a network identity.
Network Density
Knowledge brokers were an effective solution, especially for creating
network density and thus tackling the efficiency and boundaries problems.
Two types can be distinguished: the formal, institutionalized knowledge
broker' and the informal knowledge broker. The first type is represented by
the research group at TU Delft, later SLC and FMLC. In tbe cooperation
with Airbus, there were also formal knowledge brokers: contact that
brought people from Fokker AESP and Airbus together.
The second type, the informal knowledge broker is represented by infor-
mal contacts (interpersonal relationship ) and 'spin-offs'. These 'spin-offs'
were especially efficient at overcoming the knowledge protection issue.
GTM, which consists of people who worked at FMLC anJ SLC, is now
more able to share knowledge with different c1ients and less lied to protec-
live measures of other partner.
Absorpthe Capacity
Through the exchange of people betwen network partner absorpti e
capacity was created in the network. Boundarie are bridged and people
bec me more moti ated be au e of . hared pas ions. It aloprovides a mean
for context-rich personal interaction thus enabling efficient knowledge-
sharing. Two instances of personnel exchange are found, the 'nOrJnal'
exchange of people between organizations for a certain time period, like van
Wimersma and Wit, who were stationed at Airbus France for a period of
time. A second. form of personnel transfer is the 'swarming out' of graduat-
ing students from the structures group at TU Delft. They acquired knowl-
edge in the curriculum. often wrote a thesis on FMLs and sometimes stayed
one or two years at the faculty to perform testing. When they subsequently
moved tn an employer in the aerospace industry, they brought with them
their knowiedge. contacts and enthusiasm. This created motivation and
channds to find and share knowledge more efficiently.
Besides the efficient knowledge-sharing and the motivation effect, person-
nel exchange was also effective at crossing knowledge protection barriers
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(similar in effect to site visits) anJ dispersing knowleJge, thus establishing
more common knowIedge, creating absorptive capacity.
Printed and Electronic Media
Codified knowledge can be transferred through reports and information
systems. This creates knowledge-sharing opportunities, thus providing a
solution to the efficiency problem. Reports consisted mainly of test reports,
handbooks and publications. The effeetiveness of reports and pubJications
depended on the context. Because publications contained more intonna-
tion than the parties actually needed, the knowledge was sometimes not
used very effeetively. Knowledge-sbaring via reports and publications
was e pecially efficient when thc receiving party had a question that was
answered in the report.
Witb tbe development of information technology, information systems
were more often used to share information and codified knowiedge. In the
last pbase, when Airbus was beavily involved, special data links were u ed
for engineering and design, besides regular systems sueh as e-mail. But, in
general, the use of special information sy tems was ver} lirnited.
Goal Alignment
This solution concept can be pht into three: deci ions about the demarca-
tion of the work area, shared goal and focu of the industry. Fir t, demar-
cation wa us ful to ereate clear understandings of each other's task , thu
reduciog po ible competition conflicts. At one time, there were tensions
betwe n LR and TU D Ift about doing materials te tand building a te t
lab at Delft. Tb dealt ith tbi i ue b making arrangement· about the
demarcation of ta k.
Second, the common goal of the Glare project and especially of the
research programmes was to gel the material apphed to an aircraft. This
common goal was beneficiaI and attractive to all partners and thus pro-
vided the basis lor motivation. This common goal ensured that the different
individual goals of tbe partners never dominated, which would probably
have resulted in the end of the cooperation. However, the knowledge-
sharing was to some extent restricted by the different goals. Partners were
not always willing to cooperate entirely, because they had different interest
or priorities. This caused inefficiency, delayed the dèvelopment process and
reduced the motivation of other partners.
Third, at an industry level a more effkient allocativTI of research
funding could have been achieved by a greater tocus. Focus only emerged
when Airbus became fully involved. From then on research was carried
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out which was more closely adapted to the needs of a specific partner,
Airhus.
Relationships between Solution Concepts and Problems
We will complement the overview of probJems and solution concepts with
Figure 8.5 which summarizes the insights and relationships discussed. This
figure is built upon the interview data. We carefully analysed the frequency
\.\ ith which solution concepts, problems and relationships between them
were mentioned.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis provides a number of intere ting insights. First it is striking
that free-riding appeared not to be a problem in the Glare network.
Although it is a decentralized network, without a central orchestrator none
of the partie di played free-riding behaviour. The long-term scope of the
netw0rk may have prevented free-riding. At particular moments, a situa-
tion of free-riding seem to appear, but tbis is quickly corrected by other
partners. And considering the whole time span, more or less opportunistic
behaviour by a partner at one point in time i balanced by a lot of collab-
oration at another time. Second, this study showed intere ting evidence of
the importance of informal mechani ms in a decentralized network but
also demonstrated the vulnerability of these informal means (e.g. to per-
onnel change and disagreements). Anotber important finding was the
ffecti ene s of agreements on value distribution. On the one hand, thi
olution concept con titutes tru tand commitment, thus enabling
knowledge-sharing. On the other hand, agreement on value distribution
can also limit knowledge-sharing and reduce absorptive apacity. Hence,
some solution concepts may have drawbacks. Furthermore, the Glare case
also made clear that more solutions are not always better. Same solutions
are more applicable in some networks than in others.
Regarding knowledge types, the case analysis shows that it is harder to
share core and tacit knowledge than non-eore and explicit knowkdge. For
example, the knowledge regarding specific Glare properties was dililcult to
share. Sharing core knowledge increased the motivation problem, because
(industrial) partners wanted to proteet this knowIedge. But a1so at an indi-
viduallevel, peopJe were sometimes not willing to share their care knowl-
edge because of personal pride. The protection problem was reduced by
creating more commitment by formal agreements. Informally, interper-
sonal relationships, meetings, and site visits were very important to sharing
People from TU Delft with people
at Airbus Gennany and with
peopJe at A1coa and Akzo
TU Delft with Akzo, AJcoa and
3M; SLC: GRP; Barrel test;
Airbus with Fokker AESP
Site visits, trainings, meetings,
co-located teams, conference ,
social evenls
Personnel transfer, graduating
students
T,'st reports, handbooks,
publications, data-links, e-mail
Shared goal: get the material
applied; demarcation ofwork;
guidance of industry
FMLC, contact persons, 'spin-olTs'
Interpersona I
relationships
Al,'1ccment on
vaJue distribution
Direct
communications
Printed and
electronic media
Goal
aJignmcnt
Moth'ation
Boundaries
Efficiency
Free-riding
Competitioll, protectioll,
personal (pride)
Corpora te culture,
naliona! culture,
professional practices
Searching and crealing
knowiedge, dilTerent
backgrounds, personnel
change
none
Figure 8.5 So!zttion concepts in relation to knowledge-sharing problems
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core knowiedge. The Jatter three solutions have the advantage that they aJso
provide an opportunity for sharing tacit knowJedge. Sharing th is (highly)
tacit knuwledge requires absorptive capacity. But in the Glare case, a
common knowledge base was often absent and Glare's development was
slowed down by protective measures.
Considering network type the Glare network could be characterized as
a decentralized, continuous international network focu ed on a single
innovation. In a decentralized network few central solutions can be
applied, and commitment to knowledge-sharing cannot be enforced. Thu
informal and decentralized soJutions, like interpersonal relationships and
direct communications, were extremely important for knowledge-sharing.
Fortunately, because the cooperation panned a long time period, a bigger
structure could emerge from local olutions. CentraJ teams like the GRP
teams were founded, which was possible because there was funding,
support and commitment. Also the function of the knowledge centre could
become more formalized in the founding of FMLC by thrt:e network part-
ners (NLR, TU Delft, Stork Fokker AESP). These new entities at the core
()f the network never fulfilled the role of network orchestrator, however,
Clnd could not exert any power over the other network partner.
Explorative innovation i surrounded by uncertainty, as the GJare tory
clearly shows. There wa uncertainty in the application of the material
uncertainty regarding the invoJvement of network partners and often it was
uncertain whether the material wouJd ever be succe ful. Tbe indefinite
time frame and the unknown obstacle in the de elopment path were the
r a on why industrial partners 10 t motivation when clear progres and
application opportunitie were lacking. That Glare, however bec.am uc-
ce ful i largelya re uit of the pre erance of a lirnited group of 'believ-
r ' combined with the appearanc of an applicalion opportunity in hich
th advantag f Glare w r r ognized.
Was it necessary lhat thi proce look 30 year ? Perhap n I but thing
always look simpier in hindsight. The development and application of
Glare was bounded by many constraints that could not easily be changed,
like funding possibilities, application possibilities and the time needed for
the acceptance of a fundamentally new material in a community already
divided by the battle between the aluminium engineers and the composite
engineers. Moreover, in the aircraft industry, introductions of completely
new large aircraft are few and far between. The Airbus A380 was the fir t
aircraft. where Glare could be appJied on a large scale. There were a number
of other possibilities, but for various reasons Glare was not adopted in
those designs. Two of our respondents discussed this issue and said: 'We are
talking about a situation where facts and relationships have to come
together. If we did not hJve a good relationship with Airbus, Glare would
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have never been applied on Ihis plane.' 'But maybe on the Boeing: 787
inslead . .. 'Or neither. It depends on a good product and on having good
relationships. If one of these is lacking. nothing happens.'
The continuity of the network bounded opportunistic bc::haviour by
parties. There were always one or more network partners who saw the long-
term benefits of continued cooperation and knowledge-sharing. Even
when certain parties temporarily withdrew (Fokker) or permanl:n tly kft the
network (Akzo), other parties saw room for continuity. The fact that the
network was dispersed across national borders and ~ontinents did not
make knowledge-sharing easier, but good personal relationships and fre-
quent meetings between a core group of individuals kept all major network
partners involved and 'in the loop'.
It is precisely this passion for fibre-metal laminates shared by a select
number of individuals that has eventually landed Glare on the Airbus A380.
Knowledge-sharing and cooperation in the network have been a struggle at
times, but by the conscious and, more often, subconscious application of
various solution concepts the knuwledge-sharing problems of motivation
free-riding efficiency and boundaries were overcome. Eventually, 30 years
of pa ionate work on an essentially Dutch invention connected with a
window of opportunity in the fiercely competitive battle between the two
aerospace giants in the world.
SUMMARY
Thi case study de cribes the development of the new aircraft material
Glare in an international network. After 30 year of development, thi new
material wa finally applied on a large scale, on the irbu A3 O. Regarding
knowledge-sharing, it become dear that moti ation may be an important
challenge in a decentralized network where knowledge is shared with high
tacitness and coreness. It is stI;king that the free-riding dilemma was not
found, probably because the continuity of collaboration bounded oppor-
tunistic behaviour by network members. In the Glare case, knowledge-
sharing was managed by a number of means, most of which were applied
more or less unconsciously. The three most important solutions were:
(I) interpersonal relationships, which were very important in motivating
partners; (2) rules and agreements, which were important in creating com-
mitment tn engage in development; and (3) meetings, which were important
in establishing int~rp(:rsonal relationships and whi-:h served as opportuni-
ties to share knowIedge.
NOTE
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I. For th is case study, two data sources were used: interviews and documentation. The inter·
views sought to uncover multiple understandings of the ame phenornena. Eighteen inter·
views were conducted; interviewee were selected such that allthe main network player
were repre ented. The e erni-structured interviews lasted 1.5 hours on ave rage. All inter·
view' were recorded and fully tran cribed. Sub equently, the transcript ion was checked
with the interviewee. Complementary documentation consisIs, fiTst, of the book Glare:
His/ory olthe Developmell/ ola Nell' Airaafl Material, wrillen by Ad Vlot (2001). More
information about the development of Glare is found in Around Glare: A Ne... Aircrafl
Malerial ill Context, edited by Coen Vermeeren (2002). A third source of information i
the 19th Plantema Memorial Lecture by Boud Vogelesang (2003). Furthermore, different
kinds of additional documentation were collected: dissertations, newspaper articles,
public interviews, project documentation and patent databases. These sources were used
to prepare for the interviews and as a means of interpreting, checking and enriching inter-
view finclings.
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